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COMMENTS
Oklahoma’s Parentless Child: Determining the Best
Interests of the Child by Making Multilateral Adoption
Decisions*

The paramount consideration in all proceedings concerning a
child alleged or found to be deprived is the health and safety and
the best interests of the child.1
I. Introduction
In fiscal year 2004, Oklahoma had 12,347 confirmed cases of child abuse
and neglect.2 Of these children, some will be reunited with their parents in the
coming months and years and return to a world that is familiar. Others,
however, will face the terrifying loss of their mother and father through
termination of parental rights. In these cases, the children will be placed for
adoption, and home will mean the creation of a new family with new parents
who will provide them with the stability that was wanting in their biological
homes. That is the hope, at least, of those who work within the child welfare
and juvenile court systems.
Despite the hope that adoption provides for Oklahoma’s parentless children,
the quest for an adoptive home following termination of parental rights can,
unfortunately, last for months and evolve into a larger, and arguably more
entrenched, battle than the one severing the parent-child relationship. At
times, foster parents and extended family members find themselves competing
for the opportunity to adopt a child, and in that process, the best interests of the
child can quickly become lost in the din of adults fighting an emotional battle.
This comment will show that the court, as opposed to the Department of
Human Services (DHS or Department), should be the final arbiter of the best
interests of the child during adoption and that this placement determination
should be based on the collective input of the many entities involved in the
juvenile court system.
* Winner, 2005-2006 Frank C. Love Memorial Award for Outstanding Second Year
Paper. The author would like to dedicate this comment to her family for their love,
encouragement, and support and especially to her son Christian, in whose face she sees the face
of so many children desperate for a place to call home.
1. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7001-1.2(B) (2001) (emphasis added).
2. 2004 OKLA. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS. ANN. REP. 46, tbl. 13, available at http://
www.okdhs.org/ioppr/ar2003/AR2004Narratives/OKDHSAnRep04.pdf.
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Part II of this comment tracks the issue of child abuse and neglect from the
perspective of a community problem once addressed by civic organizations,
to its status as a governmental problem within the exclusive province of
professional social workers employed by DHS. Part III examines the tension
in Oklahoma between the district court and the Department regarding the
ultimate authority to make adoption placements pursuant to the best interests
of the child. Part IV analyzes the current role of other entities within the child
welfare system whose roles and participation in the process are crucial in
making a best interests determination. Part V suggests the court should be
granted review authority in adoption placements with an associated extension
of the roles played by the child’s attorney, the guardian ad litem, and the foster
parents in a multilateral approach to adoption decisions reminiscent of the
historic juvenile court. This comment concludes in Part VI.
II. From Dogs to Children: Society’s Developing Concern
for Abused and Neglected Children
A. The ASPCA and Mary Ellen: Child Welfare Gets Its Start
In 1874, America awoke to the realization that abused and neglected
children were desperately in need of advocates.3 The story of little Mary Ellen
Wilson and her plight stirred the world.4 The former neighbors of Mary Ellen
reported to Etta Wheeler, a Methodist missionary, of the mistreatment that
Mary Ellen suffered and asked Ms. Wheeler to look in on the child at her new
location.5 Under the pretext of speaking with the child’s guardian about a
sickly neighbor, Ms. Wheeler saw firsthand the heart-wrenching condition of
the child.6 Ms. Wheeler was so troubled by the child’s condition that her niece
urged her to speak with Henry Bergh, president of the American Society of the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), as the little girl was “a little
animal surely.”7

3. See Am. Humane Ass’n, The Real Story of Mary Ellen Wilson, http://www.american
humane.org/site/PageServer?pagename=wh_mission_maryellen [hereinafter Am. Humane
Ass’n, The Real Story] (last visited June 7, 2006) (extracting the story from AM. HUMANE
ASS’N, HELPING IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES: A COMPETENCY-BASED CASEWORK
HANDBOOK (2003)).
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. Am. Humane Ass’n, The Real Story, supra note 3; ETTA ANGELL WHEELER, THE
STORY OF MARY ELLEN (1998), http://www.americanhumane.org/site/PageServer?pagename=
wh_mission_maryellen_wheeler.
7. Am. Humane Ass’n, The Real Story, supra note 3; WHEELER, supra note 6.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss2/3

2006]

COMMENTS

321

Within forty-eight hours of speaking with Mr. Bergh, the child was taken
to the New York Supreme Court where Judge Lawrence had agreed to hear the
case, as juvenile courts had not yet come into existence.8 There, Mary Ellen
recounted her plight, including the physical abuse at the hands of her guardian
and her lack of any love or affection.9 Thus, on Thursday, April 9, 1874, Mary
Ellen was “rescued.”10 More importantly, however, her story generated a new
movement for a formalized child protection system. As Etta Wheeler stated,
“the time [had] come for a forward movement in the welfare of children and
little Mary Ellen’s hand had struck the hour.”11
The community and media response to this landmark case inspired a
nationwide movement for the protection of children.12 Following the rescue
of Mary Ellen, lead counsel for the ASPCA, Elbridge T. Gerry, launched a
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children.13 Among the members of
this new society were prominent members of the New York social elite,
including William E. Dodge, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and Theodore Roosevelt.14
Thus, at the inception of child welfare, the private community and community
organizations played a huge role in the developing concern for the needs of
abused and neglected children.
B. Creation of the Juvenile Court — A Community Endeavor
Community involvement in social causes such as Mary Ellen’s case and the
resulting community cry for systems to address these concerns were typical of
the late nineteenth century. Even with society plagued by timeless societal
concerns such as poverty and crime, paid social workers were uncommon and
not readily available to give assistance.15 As such, the community took on the
role presently reserved for such workers. Out of this great community
endeavor, the first juvenile court system found its support.
8. Mr. Bergh Enlarging His Sphere of Usefulness: Inhuman Treatment of a Little Waif —
Her Treatment — A Mystery to Be Cleared Up, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1874, at 8 [hereinafter
Inhuman Treatment]; WHEELER, supra note 6.
9. Inhuman Treatment, supra note 8; Am. Humane Ass’n, The Real Story, supra note 3.
10. WHEELER, supra note 6.
11. Id. (alteration in original).
12. See Am. Humane Ass’n, The Real Story, supra note 3; see also Protection for
Children: Organization of a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children — Its Scope of
Action and Its Objects, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1874, at 3 [hereinafter Organization of a Society].
The New York Times reported extensively on Mary Ellen, and the community response in
creating new organizations to protect abused and neglected children.
13. Organization of a Society, supra note 12.
14. Id.
15. MARGARET E. RICH, A BELIEF IN PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF FAMILY SOCIAL WORK 33
(1956).
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In her book A Belief in People: A History of Family Social Work, Margaret
E. Rich described the national “friendly visitor” movement and its connection
to the vast network of charitable organizations which addressed societal
concerns not yet tackled by a bureaucratic system.16 The friendly visitor idea
stemmed from charity organizations which provided a sympathetic person to
befriend a needy individual or family.17 Rich described this as “a great
experiment in citizen participation.”18 At its core, this movement responded
to suffering in America by lending family support.19
Josephine Shaw Lowell, a prominent figure in the philanthropy movement
at that time, spoke of the importance of the friendly visitor, especially in the
area of children, in her papers printed by New York’s Charity Organization
Society.20 In her paper simply entitled Children, Lowell proclaimed that “the
most important work to be done among the poor is for the children.”21 Lowell
argued that the community had a duty to care for children given the long-term
impact on society that stemmed from aiding the very young and vulnerable.22
Further, Lowell strongly advocated for the creation of a law to remove
children from abusive or neglectful homes.23 Thus, from the charitable
organizations’ friendly visitor movement sprang the support for codification
of child welfare movement goals.
In 1877, the first of several laws affecting juvenile delinquents was passed
in New York at the urging of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children, Elbridge T. Gerry’s New York initiative.24 Subsequently, the
movement for similar laws captivated the whole country, Chicago in
particular.25 Like the friendly visitors in New York, Chicago’s elite
constituted the majority of its charitable organizations and spurred the growth

16. Id. at 31.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 33.
19. See generally id. at 31-36 (discussing the rise of the friendly visitor movement as a
response to the condition of the American poor in the late 1800s).
20. See generally JOSEPHINE SHAW LOWELL, THE PHILANTHROPIC WORK OF JOSEPHINE
SHAW LOWELL 142-50 (William Rhinelander Stewart ed., 1911) (discussing the role of the
friendly visitor and the effect that the visitor can have on work with children).
21. Id. at 267.
22. Id. at 268.
23. Id. at 275-76.
24. TIMOTHY D. HURLEY, ORIGIN OF THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT LAW 14 (3d ed. 1907).
25. Id. at 14-15. Written shortly after the passage of the Illinois Juvenile Court Law,
Hurley’s work described the laws passed in New York and Massachusetts. Id. He stated that
“[s]uch were the conditions of the laws throughout the country in the year 1898, when the
charitable people of the State of Illinois were aroused.” Id. at 15.
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of a new juvenile court.26 From public interest and outcry, the first juvenile
court act was passed in Illinois in April 1899.27
Built with flexibility to address the needs of children and families, the first
juvenile court was designed “to operate with great informality.”28 Every detail
of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act (the Act) was couched in terms of working
in the interests of children rather than against a child.29 Further, the Act was
designed to safeguard the child’s reputation and protect him from the
stigmatizing label that would attach if treated as an adult.30 As such, flexibility
and informality were ideals through which the child would be protected.31
Furthermore, the juvenile court judge had a prominent role in this new court
system. In 1907, shortly after the passage of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act,
Timothy D. Hurley described the judge as a “Recording Angel” in his piece
Origin of the Illinois Juvenile Court Law.32 The judge was charged with
looking into the “past, present, and future of the child” to determine what was
in the child’s best interests.33 The judge was thought to possess the wisdom
of Solomon,34 such that he could “wave his wand of power and bring sunshine
and hope and love and light” into the life of a juvenile court child.35 In short,
the judge was the final arbiter of the best interests of the child and fashioned
all orders necessary to ensure that those interests were served.36
Thus, at its inception, the juvenile court was a community endeavor
stemming from the needs of early American society. The court was infused
with flexibility wielded by an all-powerful judge. As the juvenile court grew
stronger in intervening on behalf of children, the community support which
marked its beginning gave way under the pressure for a more professional
child welfare system.

26. See generally id. at 14-21 (describing the New York societies that encouraged
protections for children within a discussion of the concurrent community surge in Chicago
towards the same goal).
27. Id. at 41; MONRAD G. PAULSEN & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW AND
PROCEDURE 1 (1974).
28. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 27, at 2.
29. HURLEY, supra note 24, at 23-24; PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 27, at 2. See
generally Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 131 (current version at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/1-1 to 405/7-1 (2006)).
30. HURLEY, supra note 24, at 23-24; PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 27, at 2.
31. See supra text accompanying note 28.
32. HURLEY, supra note 24, at 78.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 79.
35. Id. at 78.
36. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 27, at 3.
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C. Professionalization of Child Welfare and the Community Exodus
As in the majority of major American cities, Chicago’s friendly visitor
campaign saw its demise in the rise of professionalization in child welfare.37
With the rise of the professional social worker, the concept of community or
civic service faded and was replaced by the process of “‘buy[ing] out’ of civic
responsibility” by 1929.38 The institutions and laws that had grown out of the
movement marked by Mary Ellen gave way to this new profession such that
“a new technocratic elite had wrested much of the decision-making
responsibility from native Samaritans.”39 Responsibility for social reform
shifted from the Chicago community to “a new army of professional
middlemen.”40
This shift in systemic support was recognized with enthusiasm by Homer
Folks, executive director of New York’s State Charities Aid Association for
over fifty years.41 Awarded the Theodore Roosevelt Distinguished Service
Medal in 1940 for his work in the field of social justice,42 Folks was a
prominent figure in support of the creation of a professional welfare system.43
In Folks’s paper, Child Welfare — a Job for Those Who Know How, Folks
announced the emergence of this new profession of social work.44 Folks
considered this shift to be what was best for abused and neglected children and
stressed that handling deprived children was “certainly a job for those who
know how.”45 Hence, this shift and its effect on child welfare was welcomed,
and even heralded.
D. The Oklahoma Juvenile Court Law and Professionalization
In Oklahoma, the first Juvenile Court Law (the Law) was passed on March
24, 1909.46 At the time, section 1 of the Law defined a dependent child loosely
and addressed a broad range of ill-treatment, extending from abuse and
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

KATHLEEN D. MCCARTHY, NOBLESSE OBLIGE 148 (1982).
Id. at ix-x.
Id. at xii.
Id. at 148.
Savel Zimand, Introduction to HOMER FOLKS, PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE: THE
CITIZENS’ RESPONSIBILITY xxii (Savel Zimand ed., 1958).
42. Id. at xx.
43. Id. at xxxii.
44. FOLKS, supra note 41, at 452.
45. Id. at 455.
46. Juvenile Court Law, ch. 14, art. VIII, 1909 Okla. Sess. Laws 185, 191 (originally
codified at 55 OKLA. STAT. §§ 4412-4426 (1910)); see also Ex parte Powell, 6 Okla. Crim. 495,
497-98, 120 P. 1022, 1023 (1912). The court inserted the entire text of the Juvenile Court Law
of 1909 into its opinion in Ex parte Powell so that “a complete understanding [could] be had
of the various questions considered” in the case. Id. at 498, 120 P. at 1023.
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neglect, to homelessness, to the forced use of the child as public entertainment
by way of singing or playing an instrument on the street.47 In section 7 of the
Law, children deemed wards of the court were to be awarded to associations
or individuals in whose care the child would be prepared for legal adoption;
these associations or individuals were then responsible for assenting to the
adoption, which the court would authorize.48 In Ex parte Powell,49 the
Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals held that the Law “should be liberally
construed in favor of the welfare and best interest of the child.”50 The court
was given broad authority in making determinations as to the status of a child
and in whose care the child would be placed.51 This was, of course,
reminiscent of the great informality and inclusiveness of the Illinois court.52
Since 1907, Oklahoma’s juvenile statutes have been renumbered and
modified to adapt to changing notions of the proper way to address and handle
dependent children. Now termed “deprived children,” section 70011.3(A)(14) of the Children’s Code defines what constitutes abused and
neglected children, encompassing those who lack proper parental care or
guardianship as well as numerous other dependent conditions.53 Gone are the
references to children making music on the street.
Most significantly, the scant reference to adoption from Oklahoma’s initial
Code has been replaced by an entirely separate law applicable to adoption
only.54 This can be attributed to the forward movement in adoption standards
advocated by the early child welfare workers. Laura Dester, the first director
for Oklahoma Child Welfare, stated that publicity regarding poor adoptive
conditions provided the support for “putting more teeth into [adoption] law.”55
The work of Dester marked the rise of professional social workers in
Oklahoma. In 1937, the first year that a five-county demonstration unit was
created, child welfare workers had strong community support and relied on the
47. 55 OKLA. STAT. § 4412 (1910); see also Ex Parte Powell, 6 Okla. Crim. at 498, 120 P.
at 1023.
48. 55 OKLA. STAT. § 4422 (1910); see also Ex Parte Powell, 6 Okla. Crim. at 502, 120 P.
at 1025.
49. 6 Okla. Crim. 495, 120 P. 1022.
50. Id. at 508, 120 P. at 1027.
51. See id. (describing the authority of the court to make placements for the child).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
53. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7001-1.3(A)(14) (Supp. 2005).
54. 10 OKLA. STAT. §§ 7501-1.1 to 7510-3.3 (2001 & Supp. 2005). Today, adoptions
involving deprived children are still governed by both the Oklahoma Children’s Code and the
Oklahoma Adoption Code. Although the child’s case is still controlled by the juvenile court
in applying the Children’s Code, the adoption process itself is governed by the Adoption Code.
55. LAURA DESTER, THE HALO GIRLS: THE STORY OF OKLAHOMA’S CHILD WELFARE
DIVISION 1936-1968, at 53 (Kay Boone ed., n.d.).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006

326

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:319

aid of schools, police, and ministers - cornerstones of the community.56 Dester
stated that services, including adoption services, “arose from what can only be
termed ‘grassroots involvement.’”57 As in New York and Chicago, community
leaders took positions on committees that examined issues affecting children
in their communities.58 This involvement, however, was largely at the urging
of Dester,59 and these committees did not make final decisions regarding
placement of children, as that role had been absorbed by the local child welfare
specialists.60 Thus, the role of the community in Oklahoma was relegated to
that of moral supporter.
In the years following the creation of Oklahoma’s burgeoning child welfare
system, the role of the juvenile court as delineated in Ex parte Powell adapted
to reflect the notion of a modernized professional social work system. As the
community’s participation in societal concerns regarding children waned, so
did the influence of the traditional juvenile court. Further complicating the
changing notions of the community’s and the court’s role in the care and
placement of deprived children, the Oklahoma Department of Human Services
was given the responsibility to care for deprived children.61 Reflective of the
professionalization of the field, the Department’s role was expanded in the
area of adoptive placements such that ultimate authority and control was left
in its hands rather than in the hands of associations and individuals vaguely
referred to in the 1907 Juvenile Court Law.62 This shift in placement authority
was arguably the catalyst to the debates regarding the delineation of authority
between DHS and the juvenile court, as well as the excision of community
members in the decision-making process.
III. Adoption Placements and the Shifting Roles of the District Court and
the Department of Human Services
Despite the historic juvenile court’s ability to influence adoption decisions
as discussed above, the authority of the Oklahoma juvenile court in overseeing
adoption placements has been tenuous at best.63 As the Department’s role in
56. Id. at 7-8.
57. Id. at 10.
58. Id. at 55.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 53 (noting that for approximately twenty years following the creation of the
Child Welfare Division, the Department of Public Welfare - as DHS was called at that time had the responsibility for adoptive placements).
61. Act of May 3, 1968, ch. 282, § 134, 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws 454 (codified as amended
at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7002-2.1(A) (2001)).
62. See infra text accompanying note 66.
63. See, e.g., Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals, 1978 OK 130, ¶ 36, 595 P.2d 416, 422.
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adoption expanded, it not only displaced community involvement, it grew to
overshadow and eventually eliminate the role of the juvenile court judge.64
Beginning with State ex rel. Department of Human Services v. Colclazier,65
however, the balance of power between the Department and the juvenile court
began to shift back toward recognizing the importance of the court in
placement decisions. This ruling has led to the suggested expansion of the
court’s role in adoption placements — a suggestion that would be well heeded,
as the court should serve as the final arbiter of best interests during adoption.
Prompting the Department’s claim of exclusive authority, the Oklahoma
state legislature passed a law in 1957 requiring DHS consent before a child
could be placed for adoption.66 This statute was a reaction to the growing
number of adoption agencies creating a “gray market” for adoptions in which
children were virtually sold to the highest bidder.67 With this policy
justification in mind, one can understand the rationale for having an agency’s
check on adoptions.
Nevertheless, as professionalization in child welfare and the corresponding
agency responsibility grew, so did the displacement of other parties who had
previously been involved in adoption decisions.68 Although the juvenile court
judge historically made these decisions,69 the Department’s growing
responsibility eroded the court’s role of judicial oversight. This resulted in a
divisiveness between DHS and the juvenile court that was recognized as
recently as 1997 by Justice Simms in his dissent in Colclazier, in which he
characterized “the battle of wills between the Department and the juvenile
courts” regarding placement decisions as “a persistent source of conflict . . .
for at least the last twenty years.”70 Thus, recognition of DHS consent
authority led to a modern system at odds with its predecessor.
Colclazier marked a significant shift in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma’s
treatment of cases in which DHS argued that it was vested with the exclusive

Discussing placements generally, the court stated that the Department’s autonomy “is an
obvious legislative recognition of the vast resources and qualified personnel the Department has
available, as well as of the Department's need for ‘in-house’ decision making power.” Id.
Based on that autonomy, the court concluded that DHS was not bound by a court’s suggested
placement decision. Id.
64. Id.; see also infra note 82 and accompanying text.
65. 1997 OK 134, 950 P.2d 824.
66. DESTER, supra note 55, at 53. See generally Uniform Adoption Act, tit. 10, ch. 2b,
§ 13, 1957 Okla. Sess. Laws 24-25 (codified as amended at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7505-5.4 (2001)).
67. DESTER, supra note 55, at 53.
68. See supra text accompanying note 60.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
70. Colclazier, ¶ 11, 950 P.2d at 832 (Simms, J., dissenting).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006

328

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:319

authority to make placements for deprived children.71 In this case, DHS
argued that the court did not have the authority to oversee or order DHS
placements.72 The Colclazier court responded that judicial review of
placement continued until a child was placed in DHS permanent custody, the
period following termination of parental rights,73 or until the child was no
longer a ward of the court.74
In Colclazier, the district judge had ordered that J.U., a child in DHS
custody, was to be moved to a foster home.75 On appeal, DHS argued that the
court’s order violated the Department’s sole authority to render placement
decisions based on section 7003-7.1(B)(1) of the Oklahoma Children’s Code.76
Although renumbered as section 7003-7.1(C)(1), the Code provided that DHS
“shall determine the appropriate placement of the child” when placed in the
custody of DHS.77 Considering the Children’s Code as a whole, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court ascertained that the legislature did not intend to exclude
placement determinations from judicial oversight.78 Rather, the court held that
a district court had the authority to review placement decisions affecting
children “adjudicated deprived” according to the best interests standard,
although the Department determined placements in the first instance.79 While
the court was explicit that this placement determination was subject to court
approval, it also held that the juvenile court did not have the authority to
independently make placement decisions,80 or to continue in this oversight
71. Id. ¶ 6, 950 P.2d at 826 (majority opinion).
72. Id. ¶ 8, 950 P.2d at 827.
73. The Oklahoma Children’s Code defines permanent custody as “court-ordered custody
of an adjudicated deprived child whose parent’s parental rights have been terminated.” 10
OKLA. STAT. § 7001-1.3(A)(38) (2001). Nevertheless, it is unclear whether a child
automatically enters permanent custody following termination of parental rights or whether a
court must make a finding that the child is in permanent custody. This distinction becomes
paramount as the permanent custody label coincides with the ability of a court to review
placement decisions, or not. Colclazier, ¶ 9, 950 P.2d at 827. That this label attaches following
termination of parental rights is the only clear requirement.
74. Colclazier, ¶ 9, 950 P.2d at 827.
75. Id. ¶ 4, 950 P.2d at 826.
76. Id. ¶ 6, 950 P.2d at 826.
77. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-7.1(B)(1) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added) (current version at
10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-7.1(C)(1) (Supp. 2005)).
78. Colclazier, ¶ 8, 950 P.2d at 827.
79. Id. ¶ 12, 950 P.2d at 829.
80. Id. ¶ 5 n.5, 950 P. 2d at 826 n.5. The inability of the court to make placement decisions
for children in the Department’s custody has now been codified and will be effective November
1, 2006. See Kelsey Smith-Briggs Child Protection Reform Act, H.B. 2840, 50th Leg., 2d Sess.
§ 5 (Okla. 2006) (enacted) (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-6.2(C)(1)). Nevertheless,
this new law says nothing of a court’s ability to recommend or review DHS placements. See
id.
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capacity once the child entered permanent custody.81 Nevertheless, this view
of judicial oversight was uncharacteristic of the concept of a juvenile court’s
authority at that time. In two separate opinions, Chief Justice Kauger and
Justice Simms stressed that DHS placement decisions were not subject to court
approval.82
Despite the dissenting opinions, the majority opinion in Colclazier marked
a shift back to the juvenile court system’s prior inclusiveness by recognizing
judicial oversight to a limited degree. Although the court’s authority
terminated at the point a child was placed in DHS permanent custody, the
district court was granted the authority to review placement decisions up until
that time, thereby restoring a portion of its control over such decisions.
Arguably, however, vesting DHS with sole authority to make adoption
placement decisions for permanent custody children displaced the court’s
judicial oversight of these children, designating the court a mere rubber stamp
to the Department’s adoption determinations.83
This termination of judicial oversight, however, conflicts with Oklahoma
statute. Justice Wilson, writing for the majority in Colclazier, made reference
to section 7003-5.5(E) and noted that “the district court’s continuing authority
over children adjudicated deprived is implicit in the scheme of the Children’s
Code.”84 Now renumbered as section 7003-5.5(I)(3), the statute indicated that
“the jurisdiction of the [district] court shall terminate upon final decree of
adoption,” occurring after parental rights have been terminated and the child
has been placed in DHS permanent custody.85 It would seem antithetical that
a court’s judicial oversight capacity would terminate at the point of permanent
custody, while its jurisdiction would not end until final decree of adoption.
Thus, the text of the statute suggested that a court’s review authority continues
past the point at which the child is placed in permanent custody, despite, or in
addition to, the Department’s vested placement authority. In fact, in
subsequent court decisions, Oklahoma courts have interpreted this statute to
give precisely that review authority to district courts.
81. Colclazier, ¶ 12, 950 P.2d at 829.
82. In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Kauger pointed out that DHS placement decisions
were not subject to court approval based on the express language of the legislature stating that
DHS shall have placement authority. Id. ¶ 4, 950 P.2d at 831 (Kauger, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Additionally, Justice Simms expressed in his dissent that DHS
placement authority was “unqualified.” Id. ¶ 4, 950 P.2d at 831 (Simms, J., dissenting).
83. See In re Adoption of D.D.B., 2004 OK CIV APP 31, ¶ 3, 87 P.3d 1112, 1119 (Rapp,
J., concurring) (stating that the absence of judicial review in adoption decisions “relegate[s] the
judiciary to a mere platform to rubber stamp [DHS’s] decisions”).
84. Colclazier, ¶ 10, 950 P.2d at 828.
85. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-5.5(E) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added) (current version at 10
OKLA. STAT. § 7003-5.5(I)(3) (2001)).
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In In re E.C.B.,86 the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reviewed the ability
of a district court to entertain and proceed on a petition for adoption despite
the Department’s withholding of consent.87 The court held that the district
court did not have a mechanism by which to challenge DHS’s decision to
withhold or grant consent for adoption.88 In In re E.C.B., the great aunt and
uncle of a baby whose parental rights were terminated filed a petition for
adoption of the little girl.89 The district court granted an interlocutory decree
of adoption.90 Upon notification from DHS that it did not consent, however,
the district court withdrew this decree and dismissed the petition, and the
couple subsequently appealed.91 The appellate court held that implicit in the
grant of authority to DHS under section 7003-5.5(I) is the authority to
withhold consent on a proposed adoptive placement.92 Thus, the district court
did not have the authority to order adoption of the child without this consent.93
The lower court did not, therefore, err in dismissing the petition to adopt.94
Only a year later, in In re Adoption of D.D.B.,95 a separate division of the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals disagreed with the In re E.C.B. decision,
choosing instead to view the role of the district court as extending into
adoption placement decisions.96 Relying on the Supreme Court of Oklahoma’s
1975 decision in State ex rel. Department of Institutions, Social &
Rehabilitative Services v. Griffis,97 the court in In re Adoption of D.D.B. held
that DHS “may not operate beyond the scrutiny of judicial review” — a
statement contrary to the In re E.C.B. decision.98 In In re Adoption of D.D.B.,
the Jonases, the maternal grandparents of D.D.B. and M.L.R.H., sought
adoption of their biological grandchildren following the relinquishment of
their daughter’s parental rights and the placement of their grandchildren in
DHS permanent custody.99 Following notice that the Department would not
consent to adoption by the Jonases, the district court dismissed their petition

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

2003 OK CIV APP 5, 62 P.3d 789.
Id. ¶ 11, 62 P.3d at 792.
Id.
Id. ¶ 1, 62 P.3d at 790.
Id. ¶ 5, 62 P.3d at 791.
Id. ¶ 6, 62 P.3d at 791.
Id. ¶ 11, 62 P.3d at 792.
Id.
Id.
2004 OK CIV APP 31, 87 P.3d 1112.
Id. ¶ 23, 87 P.3d at 1118.
1975 OK 164, 545 P.2d 763.
In re Adoption of D.D.B., ¶ 12, 87 P.3d at 1115 (quoting Griffis, ¶ 23, 545 P.2d at 768).
Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 87 P.3d at 1114.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss2/3

2006]

COMMENTS

331

to adopt.100 The Jonases appealed the district court’s ruling after the court held
that it did not have the jurisdiction to consider the Jonases’ petition.101
The reviewing court highlighted section 7003-5.5(I) as well as other
adoption statutes in its reference to the court’s jurisdiction, authority, and
responsibility in adoption placements.102 The court stated that the phrase
“upon the final decree of adoption,” as found in section 7003-5.5(I),
“reinforces the court’s continuing supervisory role until the adoption is
completed.”103 The court additionally looked to statutory provisions granting
review authority over approval of adoptive parents with felony backgrounds
as further evidence of this continuing jurisdiction.104 In short, rather than
circumscribing a judge’s review authority, the court found that the statutes
solidify a judge’s role in ensuring that the child’s best interests are served.
Finally, throughout the opinion of In re Adoption of D.D.B., the court
returned to the issue of a district court’s responsibility to safeguard the child’s
best interests in adoption decisions.105 The court answered its own question as
to “whether DHS is the final arbiter of the ‘best interests’ of a child in
permanent DHS custody” with a resounding no.106 In harkening back to the
Griffis decision, the court emphasized the district court’s “constitutionally
vested jurisdiction” in making decisions regarding adoption placements, going
so far as to conclude that the district court has a duty to protect a child’s best
interests.107 Although it is unclear how the Supreme Court of Oklahoma would
treat In re Adoption of D.D.B. based on its decision in Colclazier, a shift
toward granting oversight authority to the court may be occurring in the area
of adoptive placement.
Accordingly, the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion in In re Adoption of
D.D.B. comes closer to the intent and purpose of a judge’s authority and role
than does prior precedent, which suggests that a judge must not be involved
past the placement of children in permanent custody. After all, children
entering deprived care are made wards of the court, not the wards of DHS.108
Thus, while the Department is vested with the care and custody of children,109
a juvenile court judge continues in an oversight position of these children.
100. Id. ¶ 6, 87 P.3d at 1114.
101. Id.
102. Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 87 P.3d at 1115-16.
103. Id. ¶ 13, 87 P.3d at 1116 (emphasis added).
104. Id. ¶ 14, 87 P.3d at 1116.
105. Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 87 P.3d at 1114.
106. Id. ¶¶ 9-12, 87 P.3d at 1114-15.
107. Id. ¶ 18, 87 P.3d at 1117 (quoting State ex rel. Dep’t of Insts., Soc. & Rehabilitative
Servs. v. Griffis, 1975 OK 164, ¶ 20, 545 P.2d 763, 766).
108. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-4.5(A) (2001).
109. Id. § 7002-2.1.
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Furthermore, because a judge acts as the final, impartial and objective arbiter
of legal decisions and disputes,110 it makes little sense that a judge would not
perform that function in decisions affecting the future, permanent placement
of children. In short, with the laws currently in place safeguarding the
interests of children awaiting adoption and the creation of juvenile courts
themselves, the reasoning behind placing final authority in the hands of the
Department — to curtail a gray market — seems outdated and unwarranted.
Logically, then, as the role of the court has expanded in the area of
placement decisions to include adoption decisions, so too must the role of
other entities involved in the case of a permanent custody child. As noted in
his concurring opinion in In re Adoption of D.D.B., Judge Rapp stated that
“when DHS exercises its consent role, it must do so in accordance with clearly
defined criteria, findings, and conclusions” such that the Department’s
decision is based on a reviewable record.111 The Department’s burden in
creating a reviewable record for the court supports the court’s duty of
protecting the child’s best interests by exercising judicial review over adoption
decisions.112 In order to fully accomplish this, the court must be informed as
to the observations and insight provided by other agents in a child’s life, in
addition to the findings made by DHS.
IV. Beyond Professionalization: The Role of Other Participants
in Modern Juvenile Court Adoption Decisions
To fulfill its role of making a best interests determination, the court must
have information pertinent to the needs and desires of the permanent custody
child awaiting adoption. Of the parties involved in the child’s life, apart from
the court and the Department, three others have a significant impact on the
child, and have, perhaps, the most knowledge regarding the child and his or
her best interests: the child’s attorney, the guardian ad litem or Court
Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), and the foster parents. As a result, their
place in the adoption decision is essential. This part examines the current role
of these players in the adoption process. The subsequent part, in turn, suggests
110. 48A C.J.S. Judges § 147 (2005).
111. In re Adoption of D.D.B., ¶ 2, 87 P.3d at 1118 (Rapp, J., concurring).
112. See generally id. ¶¶ 1-3, 87 P.3d at 1118-19. In his concurrence, Justice Rapp
specifically stated that the “judiciary is the final arbiter of whether the adoption of a child is in
that ‘child’s best interest.’” Id. ¶ 1, 87 P.3d at 1118. Further, Justice Rapp indicated that the
Department is responsible for making a recommendation based on its own record to assure that
the adoption decision is both reasonable and rational. Id. ¶ 2, 87 P.3d at 1118. Thus, he implied
that the Department must first perform this function so that the court can then review the
Department’s decision in making the final determination as to best interests. Id. ¶ 3, 87 P.3d
at 1118-19.
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ways in which their input can be expanded to further protect the child’s best
interests in adoption decisions.
A. The Child’s Attorney: Speaking on Behalf of the Child’s Wishes
Of the attorneys involved in juvenile court, the role of the child’s attorney
is likely to have the most profound impact on the interests of the child. Unlike
the district attorney who represents the State in deprived actions,113 the child’s
attorney represents the interests of the child.114 In Oklahoma, a child is to have
separate representation once a petition is filed alleging the child to be
deprived.115 Thus, from the moment the district attorney determines that
further action is necessary to safeguard the child, the child’s attorney takes on
the responsibility of advocating for his client. The role of the child’s attorney
is supported by Oklahoma statute, Oklahoma case law, and the American Bar
Association. Some disagreement, however, centers on the manner in which
the attorney should represent the child client.
The Oklahoma Children’s Code sets out a number of duties pertaining to the
representation provided by the child’s attorney.116 Applicable to the entire
deprived proceeding, several duties would appear to extend into the adoption
phase. Included in the list, the child’s attorney must review all reports,
records, and other information relevant to the case.117 Additionally, he must
make recommendations to the court and participate in proceedings in a manner
necessary to advocate for his client.118 Deprived children need the presence of
counsel to attend proceedings as well as review documents to ensure that the
child client’s interests are maintained.
Support for the continuing duties of the child’s attorney into juvenile court
adoption proceedings arguably exists in In re Adoption of K.D.K.,119 a civil
court case appealed to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. In that case, the court
held that the trial court’s failure to appoint independent counsel for the child
113. See 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7002-3.1(A). The District Attorney is specifically charged with
the responsibility of bringing civil actions against individuals pursuant to the Children’s Code.
Id. While the role of the District Attorney is crucial for enforcement of laws and protection of
children, the District Attorney represents the interests of the State. Thus, while this role is vital
to the child welfare system, the District Attorney does not advocate on behalf of the child in the
same manner as the child’s attorney.
114. Kelsey Smith-Briggs Child Protection Reform Act, H.B. 2840, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. § 3
(Okla. 2006) (enacted) (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(A)(2)(c)).
115. Id. (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(A)(1)(a)).
116. See generally id. (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(A)(1)(a) to - 3.7(A)(2)(c))
(listing appointment mechanisms and the various responsibilities of the child’s attorney).
117. Id. (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(A)(2)(c)).
118. Id.
119. 1997 OK 69, 940 P.2d 216.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006

334

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:319

during an adoption proceeding constituted fundamental error.120 Following a
divorce between the mother and father of K.D.K., the paternal grandparents
petitioned to adopt the child without the mother’s consent.121 At a hearing on
remand from the Court of Civil Appeals, the mother asked that independent
counsel be appointed for K.D.K.122 Nevertheless, the court entered its decree
of adoption without making the appointment.123
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated that failure to appoint an attorney
at the adoption stage would effectively mean that a “child [would be] caught
in the middle while attorneys for the parties argue from the viewpoints of their
clients,”124 thereby leaving the child as the only party without a voice in the
adoption proceeding. Justice Lavender further stated in his concurrence that
“the appointment of independent counsel for the minor is essential to protect
the child’s rights and interests.”125 Debatably, then, while In re Adoption of
K.D.K. was a civil court case rather than a juvenile court case, the duties of the
child’s attorney delineated in the Oklahoma Children’s Code extend into
adoption proceedings. Further, the appointment of independent counsel
provides a voice for the deprived child in the creation of his new family.
The attorney’s duty to serve the child client throughout the adoption process
is also supported by the Family Law Section of the American Bar
Association’s Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in
Abuse and Neglect Cases (Standards),126 which were adopted by the ABA
House of Delegates in February 1996.127 In section D-13 of the Standards, the
ABA states that “the child’s attorney should seek to ensure continued
representation of the child at all further hearings . . . that result in changes to
the child’s placement . . . so long as the court maintains its jurisdiction.”128 As
already discussed, the district court’s jurisdiction does not end in Oklahoma

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. ¶ 3, 940 P.2d at 217.
Id. ¶ 2, 940 P.2d at 217.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5, 940 P.2d at 218.
Id. ¶ 1, 940 P.2d at 218 (Lavender, J., concurring).
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE &
NEGLECT CASES (1996), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/reports/standards_abuse
neglect.pdf.
127. Id.; see REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE & NEGLECT & CUSTODY
PROCEEDINGS ACT prefatory note (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Tentative
Draft 2005), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/RARCCDA/2005AMRepDraft.pdf;
Linda D. Elrod, An Analysis of the Proposed Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing
Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1999, 2000 (1996).
128. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE &
NEGLECT CASES § D-13.
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until a final decree of adoption is entered.129 Therefore, the child’s attorney
may and should, according to the ABA, seek continued representation for his
client throughout the adoption phase.130 In the comment following section
D-13, the ABA expresses the tragic reality that the child’s attorney may
represent the only continuity in the child’s case.131 Case workers, therapists,
social workers, and judges may change, and change often, in the course of a
deprived case.132 As detailed by the ABA, the child’s attorney may represent
the “institutional memory of case facts and procedural history” and best serve
the client’s interests by remaining involved until the case reaches “an
appropriate resolution.”133 As a result, the child’s attorney may do a far better
job of serving the child’s best interests in an adoption proceeding by
expressing the needs and interests of a child from a continuing and involved
perspective.
While agreement exists as to the importance and responsibility of the
attorney’s role as expressed in the ABA Standards,134 what is not as clear is the
manner in which the attorney must represent the wishes of his client.
Controversy centers on which of two models should be employed in the
representation of children in juvenile court.135 The paternalistic guardian ad
litem approach is the traditional approach, in that the attorney advocates for
the best interests of the child.136 On the other hand, the child’s wishes
approach suggests advocating for the desire of the child, where the child is old
129. See supra text accompanying note 85.
130. See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE &
NEGLECT CASES § D-12 (listing adoption as one issue that the child’s attorney may request
authority from the court to pursue).
131. Id. § D-13 cmt.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See David R. Katner, Coming to Praise, Not to Bury, the New ABA Standards of
Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 103 (2000). Katner encourages the adoption of the new ABA standards governing the
relationship between a child and his independent counsel. Id. at 104. Even though most statutes
provide for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, children still need representation from a
lawyer of their own as opposed to one who represents the child’s best interests. Id. at 107-08.
Particularly in viewing the creation of a new family, a child client may very well wish to have
an impartial attorney with whom he can confide his desires in this new family arrangement.
135. Symposium, Children’s Rights in the Context of Welfare, Dependency, and the Juvenile
Court, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 267, 272 (2004).
136. Id. at 272-73. “Proponents of the [best interests model] argue that the child’s lawyer
should advocate in juvenile court for what the lawyer determines is in the child’s best interest,
even if the lawyer’s determination differs from the child’s wishes.” Id. at 272. Leaders in the
field acknowledge that the departure really centers on the age of a child and whether children
are truly able to express their wishes in a reasonable manner. Id. at 272-73.
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enough or mature enough to make decisions for himself.137 The ABA
standards fail to clearly articulate which approach an attorney should take,
articulating instead a hybrid approach with elements of both models.138
Where a child’s attorney is to be appointed in this hybrid role, rather than
as a guardian ad litem, the proposed uniform code from the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws suggests that the
attorney should represent the child’s wishes.139 Furthermore, where the child’s
attorney determines that the child lacks the capacity to make a determination,
the attorney may represent the child’s best interests only so long as the
attorney does not take a position that is “contrary to the expressed objective of
the child.”140 Simply put, according to the proposed uniform code, the child’s
attorney must advocate for the child’s wishes even when the attorney does not
agree with the child or believes the child’s wishes do not further his best
interests.141 Thus, the proposed uniform code suggests a resolution of which
approach the child’s attorney should take in juvenile court proceedings.
In Oklahoma, it appears that the legislature has adopted the child’s wishes
model. Attorneys must advocate for the “expressed interests of the child.”142
Therefore, at least in Oklahoma, the attorney acts as the child’s voice in
determining whether a potential adoptive placement is what the child desires.
Oklahoma statute, however, does not provide further input in situations where
137. Id. at 272-73. The child’s wishes model is premised on two principles: respect for a
child’s autonomy and doubt over whether an attorney is truly able to decide what is best for a
child. Id. at 272. Proponents of this model, however, agree that where a child is unable to
direct his attorney, the attorney may provide a best interests argument. Id. at 272-73; see also
REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE & NEGLECT & CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS ACT § 12 cmt.
(Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Tentative Draft 2005), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/RARCCDA/2005AMRepDraft.pdf (providing direction for
attorneys representing the child’s wishes when the child lacks capacity to make a reasonable
decision).
138. REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE & NEGLECT & CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS ACT
prefatory note; Katner, supra note 134, at 123-24. Under the ABA standards, “a lawyer should
advocate the child’s articulated preference, but if a child will not or does not express a
preference, the lawyer should advocate the child’s legal interests determined by objective
criteria.” REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE & NEGLECT & CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS ACT
prefatory note. This suggests that the lawyer should first perform his duties according to the
child’s wishes model and then implement the best interests approach where the child cannot
express his or her interests.
139. REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE & NEGLECT & CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS ACT
§§ 4(b), 12(c)-(e).
140. Id. § 12 cmt.
141. Id.
142. Kelsey Smith-Briggs Child Protection Reform Act, H.B. 2840, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. § 3
(Okla. 2006) (enacted) (emphasis added) (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 70033.7(A)(2)(c)).
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the child is incapable of providing the attorney with his or her interests. In
such situations, the proposed uniform code arguably provides the best
alternative for Oklahoma practitioners. Where a child is too young or too
immature to state a preference, the child’s attorney should have the ability to
express what he feels is in his client’s best interests or, in the alternative,
remain silent.
In short, the In re Adoption of K.D.K. court placed great emphasis on
providing a voice for the child in adoption proceedings. Consequently, the
new ABA standards, the proposed uniform code, and Oklahoma’s statutory
provisions provide a construct by which the child can voice his or her own
interests regarding adoption via the child’s attorney. Where the judge must
provide judicial oversight of adoption proceedings, this construct provides
further input in the potential success of the placement based on the child’s
willingness and desire to join a proposed family. After all, a deprived child
may prove far better at voicing his or her own concerns regarding a potential
adoptive placement than any well-intentioned adult.
B. The Guardian Ad Litem: Speaking on Behalf of the Child’s Best Interests
Unlike the role played by that of the child’s attorney, the guardian ad litem
(GAL) advocates for the child’s best interests as opposed to the child’s
desires.143 Given the clear statutory directive that the child’s attorney must
represent the child’s desires,144 the child’s best interests may not be presented
to the court if the child is old enough or mature enough to direct his attorney
as to his wishes. This could leave the equally important aspect of presenting
best interests in the adoption proceeding to other parties such as the
Department or the juvenile court judge herself, both of whom must consider
rules, policy, and law in addition to the interests of the child. Thus, the
appointment of a GAL ensures that the child is served through the
representation of both the child’s express wishes and the child’s best interests,
with best interests being addressed by someone whose only responsibility is
to represent those interests alone.
The Oklahoma Children’s Code states unequivocally that, when
requested,145 a guardian ad litem “shall be appointed to objectively advocate
on behalf of the child and . . . to investigate all matters concerning the best

143. Id. (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(B)(4)(b)).
144. See supra text accompanying note 142.
145. Kelsey Smith-Briggs Child Protection Reform Act, H.B. 2840, at § 3 (enacted) (to be
codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(B)(2)). Per statute, the child, the child’s attorney, the
Department of Human Services, a licensed child-placing agency, or any other party to the case
may request the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Id.
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interests of the child.”146 Within this broad role, the GAL has specific
responsibilities, including the review of documents, reports, records and other
information relevant to the case, as well as the ability to interview any person
with relevant knowledge concerning the case or the child.147 Crucial to a
GAL’s role is the additional ability to meet with and observe the child,148 a role
that court personnel, a social worker, or the appointed attorney may not have
sufficient time to fulfill.149 Further, the Code specifically states that the
guardian ad litem shall monitor the child’s best interests throughout any
judicial proceeding and provide written reports that include recommendations
as to these best interests.150 Thus, like that of the child’s attorney, the role of
the GAL arguably extends into the adoption proceeding.
Although the guardian ad litem is appointed as a best interests attorney,151
the role of advocating best interests may be fulfilled by a community
volunteer.152 Thus, in Oklahoma, where a court-appointed special advocate
program is available, the legislature determined that priority shall be given to
the CASA program to serve as guardian ad litem.153 Additionally, the terms
“guardian ad litem” and “CASA” have the same force and effect.154 As
opposed to best interests attorneys, CASAs are volunteer advocates from the
community,155 and may represent the most significant return to the informality
of the historic juvenile court.
The CASA program itself, however, is a relatively new addition to child
welfare. Frustrated with the lack of available information about the children
whose futures he was determining, Superior Court Judge David W. Soukup
launched a pilot program out of Seattle, Washington, in 1977.156 Following
the passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, with
its emphasis on permanent placement, the need for CASA advocates
146. Id. (emphasis added) (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(B)(4)).
147. Id. (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(B)(4)(a)).
148. Id.
149. Davin Youngclarke et al., A Systemic Review of the Impact of Court Appointed Special
Advocates, 5 J. CENTER FOR FAM. CHILD. & CTS. 109, 109 (2004), available at http://www.
courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/JVol5-Youngclarke.pdf.
150. Kelsey Smith-Briggs Child Protection Reform Act, H.B. 2840, at § 3 (enacted) (to be
codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(B)(4)(d) to -3.7(B)(4)(e)).
151. REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE & NEGLECT & CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS ACT
§ 5 cmt. (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Tentative Draft 2005), available
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/RARCCDA/2005AMRepDraft.pdf.
152. Kelsey Smith-Briggs Child Protection Reform Act, H.B. 2840, at § 3 (enacted) (to be
codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(C)(1)).
153. Id.
154. Id. (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(C)(3)).
155. Youngclarke et al., supra note 149, at 109-10.
156. Id. at 110.
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increased.157 As a result, Soukup’s pilot program grew from 110 volunteers
advocating for 498 children to a national initiative with 930 CASA
programs — at least one in every state, plus D.C. and the Virgin Islands.158
Approximately 70,000 volunteers advocated on behalf of the best interests of
an estimated 280,000 children in 2002.159 CASA entered Oklahoma in 1984
and has grown to twenty-three independent programs within the state.160 As
evidenced by CASA’s fast growth, and the willingness of volunteers to
participate, the community has not lost its fervor in protecting the best interests
of children.
Coupled with the advocacy of the child’s attorney, the GAL or the CASA
can achieve greater stability for deprived children via their in-depth knowledge
of the child and his or her needs.161 Perhaps even more so than a best interests
attorney, who may have a high caseload, CASA volunteers have the time to
get to know the child to an extent not possible by professionals.162 As a result,
the CASA has more information regarding the child and his or her needs, and
can provide insight into the child that others may miss.163 Given the judge’s
need for a reviewable record in providing judicial oversight in adoption
decisions,164 the information provided by a CASA may complete the picture
as to a child’s needs in finding a permanent adoptive placement.
In fact, current research indicates that a CASA’s effectiveness peaks during
the adoption phase. In A Systematic Review of the Impact of Court Appointed
Special Advocates published in the Journal of the Center for Families,
Children & the Courts, researchers found that CASAs provided continuity of
representation and documentation.165 Further, researchers indicated that such
continuity was particularly important given the high attrition rate among child
welfare social workers.166 Of all outcomes studied, the data indicated that
CASAs had the greatest effect in the areas of adoption and reentry into the

157. Id. See generally Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
158. Youngclarke et al., supra note 149, at 110-11.
159. Id. at 111.
160. Oklahoma CASA, About CASA, http://www.oklahomacasa.org/index.php?page=about
(last visited June 10, 2006).
161. ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW, WHAT I WISH I’D LEARNED IN LAW SCHOOL:
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH FOR CHILDREN’S ATTORNEYS 94 (1997); see also Symposium,
supra note 135, at 270 (discussing the importance of both the CASA and the child’s attorney).
162. Symposium, supra note 135, at 270.
163. Id.
164. See supra text accompanying note 111.
165. Youngclarke et al., supra note 149, at 110.
166. Id. at 121.
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child welfare system.167 Particularly, children with CASAs were more likely
to be adopted, and were less likely by fifty percent to reenter foster care once
adopted.168 In addition to this finding, researchers stressed that statistical
analysis showed such success despite the fact that CASAs are traditionally
assigned to tougher cases in which children have been more severely abused.169
Clearly, with this data in hand, the importance of the CASA at the adoption
stage cannot be overstated, as the role of the CASA, like that of the child’s
attorney, extends into this phase of a deprived child’s case.
Moreover, given the high attrition rate of child welfare social workers, the
input of a CASA, with knowledge pertinent to a child’s needs, should not only
be welcomed but sought in the final stages of a deprived case. According to
the statistics kept by the Oklahoma County CASA Program between the years
2001 and 2004, approximately 82% of the 411 children who received aid from
a CASA had the same CASA throughout their adoption experience, whereas
only 51% of those children had the same DHS worker.170 Thirteen percent had
four or more DHS workers assigned during this time.171 Furthermore, per DHS
policy, at adoption, a child’s case is transferred to the adoption unit where the
adoption worker works in tandem with the child’s permanency worker,172 the
social worker charged with the responsibility of following the child’s case
while parental rights are intact. Included in the responsibilities of the adoption
worker are selection and preparation of an adoptive placement.173
Consequently, these duties may fall on someone with little personal knowledge
of the child. As a result, the point at which the child is preparing to reenter the
world with a new and different family is arguably the point at which the CASA
is needed the most.174
Thus, the duties assigned to a GAL, which may be fulfilled by a CASA,
may provide the greatest input into the child’s needs and should extend well
into the adoption phase. The responsibility to know the child and provide
167. Id. at 121-22.
168. Id. at 122.
169. Id.
170. Okla. County CASA Program, Child Assignment Outcome Measures 1/1/2001 to
12/31/2004 (unpublished manuscript on file with author). CASA Case Managers are
responsible for inputting information regarding the child’s case into a statistical database
created by the National CASA Program, which then organizes the information according to
outcome measures.
171. Id.
172. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:75-15-8 (Supp. 2005).
173. Id.
174. See ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW, supra note 161, at 129 (“Children . . . who
have dealt with several different workers during the adoption process, have higher rates of
adoption disruption.”).
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input to the juvenile court regarding the child’s best interests has been shown
to positively impact the child’s adoptive chances. Accordingly, the GAL’s or
CASA’s information, coupled with that of the child’s attorney, can begin to
provide the court with a more complete picture of the child and his or her own
particular needs and desires, which may not be fully articulated by the social
worker alone.
C. The Foster Parents: Informing the Court as to the Whole Child
Completing the picture of the needs of the child, the foster parents may have
the best information of all parties. Acting as the child’s surrogate parent, the
foster parents arguably know the child on a level unparalleled by other entities
in the juvenile court process. Responsible for housing, feeding, and caring for
the child, the foster parents have the ability to observe the child in a home
setting, a setting the child will be asked to permanently enter in the creation of
the child’s adoptive family. As a result, the information provided to the
juvenile court by the foster parents should be given considerable weight.
The importance of the information provided by foster parents is recognized
in the Oklahoma Children’s Code. Reflective of the weight to be given a
foster parent’s input, foster parents have the right to receive notice of
hearings,175 and an equivalent right to be heard.176 Further, foster parents can
be considered eligible to adopt a foster child when that child enters permanent
custody,177 the stage at which parental rights are terminated and the child is
deemed eligible for adoption.178 If that child has resided with the foster parents
for at least one year, great weight is to be given in considering those parents
for adoption.179 Additionally, in 2005, the legislature took further steps to
ensure that foster parents would be provided ample consideration for adoption
by amending the language of the statute to read that a foster parent “shall be
considered eligible to adopt the child,” rather than “may be considered eligible
to adopt.”180 In changing the emphasis of the statutory language, the
legislature determined that foster parents must be afforded heightened
175. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-5.6d(C) (Supp. 2005).
176. Id. § 7003-5.6(D).
177. Id. § 7003-5.6h(A).
178. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
179. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-5.6h(B).
180. See Act of Apr. 19, 2005, ch. 75, § 1, 2005 Okla. Sess. Laws 373 (codified at 10 OKLA.
STAT. § 7003-5.6h (Supp. 2005)). Compare 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-5.6h (Supp. 2005)
(emphasis added) with 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-5.6h (2001) (amended 2005) (emphasis added).
Effective November 1, 2006, foster parents will also be entitled to mediate complaints
concerning their rights based on the Department’s actions or inaction. See Kelsey Smith-Briggs
Child Protection Reform Act, H.B. 2840, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. § 2 (Okla. 2006) (enacted) (to be
codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 601.6(B)(3)).
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consideration in the first instance and a greater chance of the child’s
continuation as a permanent member of the foster family.
Clearly, Oklahoma’s statutes suggest that the relationship between foster
parent and child is so important that it merits increased support once the child
is deemed in permanent custody. While supporting the continuation of a
positive parental relationship should be encouraged, foster parents, where
unable to adopt the child themselves, should also be encouraged to provide
input as to what home will best support the child and make the most successful
transition into permanency. Case law has provided support for the family
relationship between foster parents and child, as well as the need for foster
parent input in juvenile court proceedings.
In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,181 the U.S. Supreme Court
indicated in dicta that foster parents have a limited constitutional liberty
interest in the foster family relationship.182 The Court assumed for purposes
of its holding that foster parents did, in fact, have such an interest.183 In Smith,
foster parents and a foster parent organization brought suit against New York
for the manner in which foster children were removed from the foster home.184
Although foster parents were given the task of daily supervision of the children
customary of legal custody, the foster parents were recognized as not having
full authority as a custodian.185 As a result, New York reserved the discretion
to move foster children at will.186 In attempting to resolve the issue of
procedural due process,187 the Court chose to examine the familial relationship
between foster parent and child.188 In discussing this relationship, the Court
analogized the relationship between foster parents and child to a marital
relationship, reasoning that, although the two relationships were not
determined by blood, they were yet still family members.189 Further, the Court
stated that “no one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and
interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care may
exist even in the absence of blood relationship.”190 Consequently, the ties
between foster parent and child may, in some cases, be “as close as those

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

431 U.S. 816 (1977).
Id. at 842.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 819-20.
Id. at 827.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 842.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 844.
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existing in biological families.”191 Thus, the Court implicitly recognized that
a liberty interest did exist in the integrity of the foster family unit.192
This recognition was emphasized by the Tenth Circuit in Spielman v.
Hildebrand.193 Relying on Smith, the Tenth Circuit noted that “neither
biological nor adoptive ties are essential for developing a protected family
relationship.”194 In Spielman, the Spielmans brought a claim against the
Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (Kansas Department)
because of the removal of their foster daughter, even though the Kansas
Department told the foster family to treat the child as their own.195 Despite the
subsequent return and adoption of the foster child by the Spielmans,196 the
Spielmans brought a due process claim against the Kansas Department for
removing the child without a prior hearing.197 Like the Smith Court, the Tenth
Circuit examined the private interest between foster parents and foster child
before determining whether a due process violation took place.198 Although
the court noted that the status of preadoption may, in fact, confer a more
significant familial relationship, the court recognized the emotional ties that
exist between foster parents and the children in their care.199 Thus, federal law
suggests that the relationship between foster parent and child equates with that
of blood families and should be treated as such.
Given the recognition in statute and case law of the family ties between
foster parent and child, and the great weight placed on that relationship, a
foster parent’s input should logically extend into adoptive placement decisions.
In In re B.C.,200 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma addressed the right of foster
parents and parents in loco parentis, persons in the place of parents, to
intervene in adoption proceedings involving foster children.201 While the court
held that foster parents should be allowed to intervene as a matter of right, the
court additionally concluded that they should “participate as parties in all
further proceedings.”202 In In re B.C., the trial court relinquished jurisdiction
in a juvenile proceeding so that the former foster parents of B.C. could adopt

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 845 n.52.
Id. at 842.
873 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1378.
Id. at 1380.
Id.
Id. at 1383.
Id. at 1384.
1988 OK 4, 749 P.2d 542.
Id. ¶ 20, 749 P.2d at 545.
Id. (emphasis added).
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the child.203 Nevertheless, the trial court denied the petition for leave to
intervene filed by the current foster parents, although B.C. had been in their
home four years.204 On remand, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled that the
current foster parents should be allowed to intervene.205 Most importantly,
however, the court relied on its holding in Griffis, stating that a foster parent’s
“intervention will better enable the trial court to have before it ‘all the
evidence concerning the child’ in making its final decision.”206 Thus, apart
from a foster parent’s unequivocal right to be considered as an adoptive
placement, a foster parent also has, and must have, the ability to speak on
behalf of the child’s best interests during the adoption phase.
Where a foster family relationship accords with that of a biological
relationship, foster parents have been recognized as performing the role of
natural parents. As a result, foster parents have information pertinent to the
child which only a parent can know: important events and dates, favorite
meals, and a child’s ability to cope with stress and changing situations — all
of which factor into adoptive placements. The modification of Oklahoma
statutes applicable to the rights of foster parents demonstrates that this
relationship is recognized by legislators and their constituents.
Acknowledging the importance of the foster family, federal and state case law
demonstrate the deference and consideration afforded to the emotional ties
resulting from this relationship. Where a foster relationship does not lend
itself to permanency via adoption, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has
nevertheless recognized the importance of according the foster parents a voice
in all proceedings, inclusive of adoption proceedings. Permitting the input of
foster parents indicates that the knowledge possessed by these individuals will
transfer to the district court in its review of potential placements and,
hopefully, to the placement itself.
V. Room to Grow: Expanding Adoption Placement Dialogue
to Include Other Parties to the Case
As the child’s attorney, guardian ad litem, and foster parents have
information specific to the child’s desires and needs, their input is essential in
making a successful adoptive placement for the child. While these entities
have a place in the current juvenile court system, their position as it relates to
the creation of an adoptive family could be strengthened in a number of areas:
203. Id. ¶ 1, 749 P.2d at 543.
204. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 749 P.2d at 543.
205. Id. ¶ 20, 749 P.2d at 545.
206. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Dep’t of Insts., Soc. & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Griffis, 1975
OK 164, ¶ 26, 545 P.2d 763, 768).
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safeguards that ensure their continued presence in the adoption phase,
recognition of their impact, and participation in criteria staffings. First and
foremost, however, a return to the inclusiveness of the historic juvenile court
would assist in creating an environment where all persons with information
relevant to the child can play a part.
A. Recapturing the Past: Inclusive Dialogue and an Informal Environment
for Adoption Decisions
As discussed earlier in this comment, one of the most striking aspects of the
historic juvenile court was the strong presence of the community.207 Apart
from encouraging the strengthening of social work and the creation of a
juvenile court itself, the community, both nationally and here in Oklahoma,
laid the groundwork for the burgeoning court system.208 With the rise of the
professional social worker, however, the community was displaced by trained
and degreed court personnel.209 While this shift in decision-making authority
has debatably instituted greater, more formalized protections,210 this shift
should not generate an exclusive juvenile court system that gives little regard
to the input of those who know the child well.
Quite the contrary, great importance was historically placed on an inclusive
court system by influential system reformers who, despite their advocacy for
a professionalized system, felt that the community and system professionals
should work together. Homer Folks, for example, was one of the foremost
advocates of the professionalization of social work during a period of
sweeping child welfare reform.211 Regardless of Folk’s support for
professionalization, Folks declared that, although “it might seem at first
thought that the development of professionals was opposed to the development
of volunteer work,” quite the opposite was true.212 Folks stated that
professionals and volunteers were each a necessity in social welfare systems
and that “experience has proven . . . that each group is necessary to and
develops with the other.”213 Furthermore, Folks stressed that one of the
primary duties of professionals was the inspiration and edification of
volunteers such that “development, progress, growth, [i.e.,] a ‘move upon

207. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (noting the public interest that sparked the
creation of the first juvenile court).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 26 and 57.
209. See supra text accompanying note 39.
210. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
212. FOLKS, supra note 41, at 29.
213. Id. at 30.
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conditions,’” would be evidenced in societal concerns.214 In fact, Folks
seemed to suggest that the necessity of both professionals and volunteers was
a given; the only “puzzling” question that remained was “just what relations
between the [volunteer] workers and the [professional] workers [would] secure
the largest return from the work of both.”215 Thus, as a leader of system
reform, Folks suggested that professionalization should work to strengthen
community involvement, not to displace it. Nevertheless, historic proposals
for system reform appear to have been accepted in a piecemeal fashion
whereby some, but not all, changes have been adopted, thereby creating an
exclusive system at odds with its predecessor.
The need for a cohesive child welfare system wherein all entities work
together to ultimately improve the community is as relevant today as when
Folks made his proposals for system reform. Accordingly, the CASA program
and recruitment of foster parents are encouraging signs that community
involvement is on the rise. The staggering growth of the CASA program
itself, discussed above,216 provides such an indication, and may represent a
significant return to community involvement in adoption decisions reminiscent
of the pre-professionalization juvenile court. Further, the input provided by
foster parents lends support for the needs of a foster child, and also provides
a voice to the neighborhoods that will ultimately come to accept a foster child
as a permanent member of their community. As such, the creation of an
inclusive environment where such individuals, to include the child’s attorney,
can represent deprived children throughout the entire proceeding harkens back
to a time when the court could best be described as a fluid environment in
which the exchange of ideas was free-flowing. As previously examined, this
informality was thought to be an ideal means by which the child could be
protected.217
Of course, this environment was largely attributable to the impact of the
historic juvenile court judge. As previously noted, the judge was seen as a
great fount of wisdom who set the tone and pace for the court.218 In Timothy
Hurley’s book Origin of the Illinois Juvenile Court Law, written eight years
after the first juvenile court act was passed, the judge was depicted as making
inquiries and generally permitting the free exchange of ideas.219 In such an
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
218. See supra text accompanying note 34.
219. See generally HURLEY, supra note 24, at 80-83. Hurley described a typical day in
deprived court, which generally depicts the judge conferring with parents, workers, and
community members in the disposition of each case. Id.
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environment, parents and neighbors were free to talk openly with the judge as
he passed his “wand of power” over the child.220 As professionalization
lessened the impact of the community, it also displaced the role of the juvenile
court judge and his ability to oversee adoption decisions.221 Thus, with the
shift to reinvigorate the role of the court in adoption placement decisions, the
juvenile court judge could once again shape the tone and pace of adoption
dialogue. At a minimum, judicial encouragement and support for the
participation of the child’s attorney, GAL, and foster parents would
promulgate inclusive dialogue and create a holistic environment, akin to that
envisioned by system reformers, wherein the input of all parties would ensure
that the best interests of the child are truly paramount.
B. Legislated Inclusiveness: Statutory Amendment Recognizing the Court’s
Oversight of Adoption Decisions and Power to Construct a Cooperative
Environment
Despite the need for a judge-led return to the inclusive tone and pace of the
historic adoption process, only incremental steps have occurred in
reestablishing the role of the judge in adoption placement decisions.222
Whereas the Colclazier court restored a degree of judicial oversight to
placement decisions, the court was clear that this oversight function did not
attach to adoption placements.223 Building on this recognition of judicial
authority, however, the In re Adoption of D.D.B. court emphasized the district
judge’s duty to oversee these decisions.224 The court did so by extrapolating
duties and responsibilities from statutes that were suggestive of judicial
oversight during the adoption phase.225 Nevertheless, as was pointed out in the
dissents to Colclazier, the statutes would seem to suggest that the Department
is vested with sole authority to determine placements, including the authority
to oversee them.226 As a result, a statutory amendment recognizing the
function of the juvenile court judge in decisions affecting adoption placements
would finally resolve this source of conflict between the juvenile court and the
Department, while also setting the stage for truly productive dialogue between
all parties.227
220. See supra text accompanying note 35.
221. See State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Colclazier, 1997 OK 134, ¶ 10, 950 P.2d
824, 828; see also supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
222. See supra Part III.
223. See supra notes 73, 80-81 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
226. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
227. Recent amendments to section 7003-6.2(C)(1) of title 10 may hinder rather than help
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The inclusion of a broad-based and loosely defined statute recognizing the
oversight capacity of the juvenile court would reflect the advance in case law
and statute suggestive of this judicial function. One year following the
Colclazier opinion, the state legislature amended the Oklahoma Children’s
Code to extend judicial review over adoption placement decisions involving
foster parents.228 These amendments emphasized the role of the court, as
opposed to the Department, in determining whether a foster parent could be
considered for adoption.229 As discussed earlier in this comment, this same
statute was also recently amended to provide for heightened protections for
foster parents interested in adoption.230 Nevertheless, the oversight capacity
of these determinations was not removed from the court. Thus, at least in the
case of foster parents, judicial oversight over adoption placement decisions has
expanded. Consequently, a statute within the Oklahoma Children’s Code
expressing the ability of the district court to review all placement
determinations according to the best interests standard would be a natural step
in recognizing judicial oversight where specific legislative amendments
affecting adoption placements have yet to be made. Furthermore, a court’s
ability to review permanent or long-term placements would complement the
court’s current ability to review certain temporary placements.
Despite language suggestive of the Department’s sole authority to make
placements, the court has been granted review authority over several
placement determinations. Per section 7003-7.1(C)(1), the placement of any
child in DHS custody shall be determined by the Department.231 Lacking from
this preliminary statement is any indication of judicial authority in these
determinations. As examined by the Colclazier court, however, the following
two sentences of the statute provide direction as to the role of the court in two

in clarifying the authority and the role of the court. Effective November 1, 2006, this section
will read: “If the child is placed in the custody of the Department, the court may not direct the
Department to place the child in a specific home or placement.” Kelsey Smith-Briggs Child
Protection Reform Act, H.B. 2840, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. § 5 (Okla. 2006) (enacted) (to be
codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-6.2(C)(1)). Although the court is only instructed that it
cannot make a placement, it says nothing of the court’s ability to oversee or suggest an adoptive
placement. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, some may suggest that
this amendment acts to circumscribe a court’s review authority over placements, in general and
at the adoption phase; this interpretation would represent a significant step back from
reestablishing the important judicial oversight function of the court.
228. Oklahoma FOCUS in Foster Care Act, ch. 414, § 18, 1998 Okla. Sess. Laws 2069-70
(codified as amended at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-5.6h (Supp. 2005)) (adding a new statutory
section to emphasize the role of the court in foster parent adoptions).
229. Id.; see also 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-5.6h(B) to -5.6h(C) (Supp. 2005).
230. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
231. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-7.1(C)(1).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss2/3

2006]

COMMENTS

349

placement determinations.232 First, the statute indicates that prior approval of
placement by the court is required when the child is to be returned to his or her
biological parents.233 With the purpose of court involvement being to protect
an abused or neglected child,234 it is understandable that judicial oversight
would attach to any placement returning a child to the home which constituted
a detrimental risk to the child. Second, apart from this instance of judicial
oversight, multiple changes in placement must also occur within parameters
placed on the Department via statute.235 When a child is moved multiple times
between court dates, the court must approve those placement changes as well
as determine their necessity,236 as the potential for a detrimental impact on an
already fragile child is high.
Thus, the Oklahoma Children’s Code currently recognizes judicial oversight
of temporary placement decisions but has largely ignored oversight of
permanent placements, thereby leaving decisions having significant long-term
effects on a child outside of judicial scrutiny. As a result, a statutory
amendment predicated on a best interests standard, as suggested above, would
ensure that the district court may oversee an adoption if concerns arise, but
would not be required to do so in every case. Clearly, judicial oversight is
warranted when returning a child to his biological home or when multiple
moves occur between court dates. When permanent placement is involved,
however, judicial oversight is also imperative.
In addition, a loosely-defined statute granting review authority to district
courts would provide a mechanism for individualizing a particular child’s case
and adoption. Whereas the Department advocates on behalf of the best
interests of the child within the confines of Department policy,237 the child’s
attorney, guardian ad litem, and foster parents advocate on behalf of the
individual child alone. Were a court required to make a determination
involving the best interests of the child during the adoption process, the court
would need information pertinent to the desires and needs, fears and
frustrations of the individual child. This information can only be relayed by
those who know the child well.238 And, as was examined earlier, complete
232. State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Colclazier, 1997 OK 134, ¶ 8, 950 P.2d 824, 827.
233. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-7.1(C)(1).
234. See 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-1.1(A)(1) to -1.1(A)(2) (2001) (noting that reports
concerning the alleged abuse or neglect of a child initiate the process of court intervention).
235. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-7.1(C)(1) (Supp. 2005).
236. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-5.4a(B) (2001).
237. Cf. Roger H. Stuart, Okla. County Special Judge, Address for Oklahoma Lawyers for
Children: Top-Down Decision-Making 2 (transcript on file with author) (suggesting that the
needs of deprived children and their families are “predetermined and . . . shrouded by the
mysteries of the bureaucratic [process]” such that individuality can be lost within that process).
238. Id. at 3. Judge Stuart specifically states that “tending to the needs of deprived children
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knowledge of the individual child can only be accomplished via the combined
information of the Department, the child’s attorney, the GAL, and the foster
parents.239 Thus, a statute recognizing judicial oversight would empower a
court to shape the decision-making process for each child according to the
child’s individual needs, thereby encouraging inclusive dialogue between all
parties. Before such dialogue can occur, however, the status of the individual
parties must be recognized in tandem with the review authority of the court.
C. Recognition that the Roles of the Child’s Attorney and Guardian Ad
Litem Continue into Adoption to the Same Extent Recognized for Foster
Parents
Although statute and case law have recognized the continued weight of the
foster parents’ input in the adoption placement decision, as examined earlier,240
the same recognition for the child’s attorney and the guardian ad litem has not
been articulated. In fact, the statutory provisions governing the duties of the
child’s attorney and the GAL are complicated by the existence of two codes
governing adoption, the Children’s Code and the Adoption Code, rather than
a single, unified code applicable to deprived children alone.241 As a result, a
statutory provision clarifying the continuing responsibility of both the child’s
attorney and the GAL, like a statute recognizing the role of the court, would
ensure their ability to advocate on behalf of the child during all phases of a
deprived case, including adoption.
Despite the existence of two codes governing adoption, the duties of both
the child’s attorney and the GAL are governed by the Children’s Code.
Section 7003-3.7(E) of that Code, applicable to the duties of the child’s
attorney and the GAL, states specifically that the provisions of that Code do
not apply to adoptions not involving deprived children.242 Rather, purely
private adoptions in which the interests of a child do not require public action
via the juvenile court shall be governed by the Adoption Code alone.243
Conversely, then, the provisions of the Children’s Code applicable to the
duties of the child’s attorney and the GAL would continue so long as the child
remains a deprived child. Consequently, the plain language of section 70033.7(E) would suggest that the Children’s Code is the appropriate code for

requires specific knowledge of the individuals involved in the case.” Id.
239. See supra Part IV.
240. See supra Part IV.C.
241. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
242. Kelsey Smith-Briggs Child Protection Reform Act, H.B. 2840, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. § 3
(Okla. 2006) (enacted) (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(E)).
243. Id.
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determining the roles played by the child’s attorney and the GAL throughout
the adoption process.
Nevertheless, the language pertinent to the duties of the child’s attorney and
the GAL do not specify whether those roles are dependent on the status of the
child or the nature of the proceeding. In addressing the duties of the child’s
attorney, the Children’s Code plainly states that an attorney shall be appointed
to represent the child, without reference to the status of the child as simply
deprived or permanent custody.244 Likewise, the GAL is merely instructed to
“objectively advocate on behalf of the child.”245 As to the nature of the
proceeding, the child’s attorney must participate in proceedings where
appropriate,246 whereas the GAL must monitor the child’s best interests
“throughout any judicial proceeding.”247 Nothing indicates that the role of the
child’s attorney or the GAL ends once a child is placed in DHS permanent
custody. Quite the contrary, the statute would suggest that these roles continue
into adoption based on the reference to both the child’s status and the
proceeding. Thus, the language used to characterize the roles of the child’s
attorney and the GAL suggest that these roles continue so long as necessary
to ensure that the best interests of the child are served.
Despite the generalized nature of the statutory language, an amendment
clarifying the continuing role of both the child’s attorney and the GAL would
ensure that these parties could provide input as to the needs of the child during
adoption. Just as the oversight function of the court has been perceived to
terminate at permanent custody, the continued presence of the child’s attorney
and the GAL could be perceived to terminate as well. After all, if the court is
not empowered to oversee an adoption placement, it would make little sense
that other parties would continue to provide input during this phase. Further,
the language used to describe the role of the GAL in monitoring best interests
does not suggest active involvement on the part of that entity.248 Thus, like an
amendment specifying a court’s power to review any decision based on best
interests, a statute authorizing the continued input of the child’s attorney and
the GAL until jurisdiction of the case terminates would ensure that these
parties, who know the individual wishes and needs of the child, could continue
to represent them.
Recent statutory amendments nearly ensure the continued involvement of
these entities during adoption. Effective November 1, 2006, section 70036.2A(A) of the Oklahoma Children’s Code will read:
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(A)(2)(a)).
Id. (emphasis added) (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(B)(4)).
Id. (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(A)(2)(c)).
Id. (emphasis added) (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-3.7(B)(4)(d)) .
Id.
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At any hearing pursuant to the provisions of the Oklahoma
Children’s Code for the purpose of determining the placement of
a child[,] . . . the court shall provide an opportunity to a
representative of the Department of Human Services, the present
foster parent, the guardian ad litem and the child, if of sufficient
age as determined by the court, to present sworn testimony
regarding the placement of the child . . . .249
In addition to the Department and the foster parent, both the GAL and the
child’s attorney, as the child’s voice in court, will be permitted to testify
regarding placements.250 As discussed previously, this generalized language
also suggests active participation of these entities in placement decisions;
nevertheless, specific reference to adoption placements would foreclose any
suggestion that these entities operate from an inactive perspective during this
phase.251 Further, the ability to present sworn testimony does little to ensure
that an adoption placement is the best possible match for a child if that
testimony is not accompanied by a corresponding ability to work with other
system professionals beforehand.
In summary, consistent with Oklahoma case law that has clearly expressed
the necessity of a foster parent’s input at adoption,252 this same safeguard
should be instituted for the child’s attorney and the GAL. Further, as the
oversight capacity of the court has expanded,253 the judge should be
empowered to review Department decisions according to the best interests of
the child. Nevertheless, as indicated above, the ability to review these
decisions is predicated on the individualized knowledge of the child —
knowledge possessed only by those who know the child well.254 An
amendment recognizing the specific roles of the child’s attorney and the GAL
at adoption, like the recognition currently afforded foster parents, would
ensure that the court’s need for individual information would be fulfilled.
D. Criteria Staffing and the Express Inclusion of Other Parties
As examined earlier, recognition of the court’s continued oversight of
adoption placements harkens back to a historic juvenile court in which the
judge permitted the input of those persons who could inform him as to the

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. § 6 (emphasis added) (to be codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7003-6.2A(A)).
Id.
See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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needs of the child.255 Even so, creating such an environment today can be
complicated by a professionalized system that can, at times, obscure rather
than ensure the fulfillment of the child’s needs.256 It has even been suggested
that new philosophies and further systemization of child welfare, rather than
ensuring further success with these children, instead strays from the solution
and may represent further back-tracking.257 As such, based on the statutory
amendments above, a court’s ability to construct an inclusive environment
including all parties with information pertinent to a permanent custody child
may provide the best solution to this complex system. Thus, the court must
have the ability to require the Department, the child’s attorney, the GAL, and
the foster parents to engage in dialogue regarding problems or concerns if they
arise. The current DHS process of criteria staffing provides a ready-made
forum for this dialogue, and consequently, represents a return to the inclusive
and informal decision-making process that defined the juvenile court.
The Department of Human Services criteria staffing represents the gateway
to adoption for permanent custody children. Criteria staffing serves as a
means of determining the appropriate adoptive placement for a child based on
a form to be completed by the child welfare worker, supervisor, and various
service providers.258 The criteria staffing includes reference to prospective
adoptive placements, barriers to adoption, and the specific needs of the
child.259 Usually, however, the form is accompanied by a meeting during
which Department staff and other invited guests discuss prospective adoption
for the individual child.260 This face-to-face gathering and the document itself
provide a mechanism for system professionals to begin to converse regarding
the potential success of an adoption via consensus as to what information
should be included in the form. The identification, however, of who qualifies
as a professional or service provider, and thus who may provide input in the
form or who may attend the criteria staffing, is not clear from the text of the
Oklahoma Administrative Code governing this process.
255. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
256. Stuart, supra note 237, at 6.
257. Id.
258. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:75-15-41 (Supp. 2005).
259. Id.
260. Dep’t of Human Servs., Instructions to Staff 340:75-15-41,
http://www.policy.okdhs.org/ch75/Chapter_75-15/ (follow “SUBCHAPTER 15. ADOPTIONS”
hyperlink; then follow “340:75-15-41. Adoptive placement criteria staffing” hyperlink; then
follow the first “INSTRUCTIONS TO STAFF 340:75-15-41” hyperlink) (last visited June 11,
2006) [hereinafter Instructions to Staff]. Under section 1(1) of the Instructions to Staff, the
DHS worker is instructed to set the “time and place for the criteria staffing,” indicating that the
criteria staffing is, in fact, a meeting although the Oklahoma Administrative Code only refers
to a form. Id. § 1(1).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006

354

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:319

Currently, however, Department policy indicates that the adoption process
as a whole is a “team effort,”261 suggestive of the necessary participation of all
persons with information pertinent to the needs of the child. Further, recent
changes to staff instructions accompanying Department policy provide specific
reference to the participation of CASA, when assigned, in the criteria staffing
process.262 According to those instructions, the assigned CASA is to review
the form once it is completed by the social worker and should receive
notification of the upcoming meeting.263 In addition, these same instructions
imply that entities involved in the child’s case may also be included in the
process if these parties possess “information that may assist in planning for the
child.”264 While this general invitation is extended upon the action of the
social worker, the child’s attorney and the foster parents are not specifically
included in the list of who constitutes such persons.265 Thus, at a minimum,
the GAL or CASA should be afforded an opportunity to review the form and
receive notification of the criteria staffing. The child’s attorney and the foster
parents, however, may not be included despite recognition in DHS policy that
adoption is a team effort.
Nonetheless, recognition of the adoption process as a team effort provides
a concerned court with a forum for addressing the placement needs of the
child. Rather than instructing all parties to gather and come to consensus, the
court could order that all parties meet within the context of the criteria staffing
to discuss a particular case. Further, this could provide a mechanism for
system professionals to discuss placement concerns before providing sworn
testimony at a placement hearing, a right that will soon take effect.266 As such,
this forum, tailored to address potential placement, would provide a specific
process by which a juvenile court judge could construct an inclusive
environment for addressing the best interests of the child.
In short, the current process of criteria staffing provides the court a forum
for inclusive dialogue reminiscent of the historic court. Marked by the need
to ensure that the best interests of the child are served, the inclusion of all
parties who know the child guarantees that the court can, in fact, determine
that the appropriate placement decision has been made. As the Department
already has a process in place to address the particular needs of an individual
child, it is a natural step for a court with oversight authority to instruct all

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:75-15-41.
Instructions to Staff, supra note 260, § 1(3).
Id.
Id. § 1(4)(A)(ii).
See id. § 1(4)(A).
See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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parties recognized as having valuable information regarding a child to work
together in that forum to determine the best adoptive match.
VI. Conclusion
At its inception, the historic juvenile court understood that protecting
abused and neglected children was a community endeavor. Further, that court
recognized that the creation of a home for a deprived child in the aftermath of
losing his own biological parents was a task greater than the court could
address alone. The heralded creation of a professional social welfare system
was thought to be the solution to the human endeavor of rebuilding families
and returning hope to children. But, where familial ties have been broken, the
creation of new ones is the greatest work to be done for a child. Such lifealtering decisions must be extricated from the confines of a system that grows
more entrenched as each participant in a deprived case individually scrambles
to determine the best interests of a child. As recognized by many scholars in
the field, “the juvenile court needs an overhaul, a return to the informality of
an earlier day” that centered on informal discussion inclusive of all parties.267
As such, the Department, the child’s attorney, the GAL, and the foster parents
should work together as a team to determine the best possible adoptive
placement for the child so that the court can rule that best interests have, in
fact, been served. Thus, where little Mary Ellen’s hands signaled the forward
movement of child welfare in America,268 Oklahoma could signal a return to
the influence of that era where the modern system, struggling to improve the
life of children, got its start.
Cara Rodriguez

267. Symposium, supra note 135, at 281.
268. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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